4th Cir.: State protection & advocacy agency cannot sue other state officials in federal court

The Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy cannot sue state health officials in federal court because sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing "intramural" disputes between agencies of a state.

 Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Reinhard, --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 1524451 (4th Cir. June 2, 2009) (No. 08-1845).

 

VOPA is the state’s protection and advocacy (P&A) agency. While some state P&As are independent non-profits, others are quasi-independent state agencies; VOPA is in the latter group. VOPA claims that the state Department of Mental Health is withholding certain records, relevant to investigations of discrimination, abuse and neglect, to which it is entitled under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15043, 10805. VOPA argued that its federal suit fell under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, because it sought prospective relief against state officials to end an ongoing violation of federal law.  Addressing what it said was a question of first impression, the panel declined to “extend” Young to plaintiffs who are state agencies rather than private organizations or individuals. (Although not previously ruled on by any other court, one judge in a prior case between these parties raised the issue. VOPA v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185 (4th Cir.2005) (Wilson, J., concurring).) The opinion is loaded with rhetoric about “our system of dual sovereignty” and “the dignity of the states.”

 

          The court assumed without discussion that sovereign immunity would generally apply to suits between state agencies, in contrast to suits between different states or between federal and state governments. The court reasoned that, although no authority expressly limits Young to private plaintiffs, many precedents “have recognized this basic element of the doctrine.” The court further reasoned that Young should not be extended to any type of proceeding that was “anomalous and unheard of when the constitution was adopted.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding Eleventh Amendment bars federal fair-labor claims in state court). VOPA’s suit, the court said, had “no similar historical pedigree, and it would be a more obvious affront to a state’s sovereign interests” than a suit by a private party.

 

The court added a few more arguments. It said that permitting such suits in federal court “would create difficult questions of political accountability,” because citizens would not know who to blame for a disfavored outcome. And it analogized this case to precedents barring political subdivisions of states from asserting preemption claims against state laws, albeit not on grounds of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Stanley v. Darlington Cty. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1996) (in desegregation suit, no jurisdiction over cross-claim for contribution by district against state). Finally, court said applying Young here would allow “potentially limitless” federal suits between a variety of state agencies and officials.

 

          The court recognized several important limitations on its holding. First, it “in no way limits the scope of Ex parte Young for private plaintiff. Second, the court observed that “VOPA may bring this suit in state court and obtain the same relief it seeks here”; the parties agreed that state immunity would not bar such a suit. Finally, the court said that Congress had the power to provide for suits like this one in federal court by abrogating or demanding a waiver of states’ immunity under the relevant statutes. The court said that neither Developmental Disabilities Assistance Act nor the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act gave any indication of congressional intent to secure abrogation or waiver of immunity. The court suggested that Congress might be able to achieve abrogation and could definitely achieve waiver, but “has not even tried” to do so.

 

          The decision does not affect the ability of state P&As that are set up as private entities to sue in federal court. A P&A organized as a state agency would not be barred from initiating a suit with individual persons with disabilities or private non-profits as plaintiffs, so long as those plaintiffs had standing.